In the wake of renewed tensions following the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan has declared that the Shimla Agreement, signed in 1972, stands suspended. Though the announcement is politically charged, it raises the question: how practical is it to abandon a framework that underpins both the territorial status quo in divided Kashmir and the principles of a long-standing bilateral arrangement between the two countries?
The Shimla Agreement was negotiated after the 1971 war and remains one of the most consequential bilateral understandings between India and Pakistan.
It formally converted the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir into the Line of Control (LoC)—a de facto border that both sides have since observed, with occasional violations and military confrontations.
It also declared Kashmir a bilateral issue and committed both sides to resolving disputes through bilateral means, keeping third-party intervention out of the equation.
The agreement has served as a practical framework for managing the division of Kashmir.
Both India and Pakistan control parts of the former princely state—territorial realities that the Shimla Agreement did not seek to resolve, but sought to manage and contain.
In that sense, the agreement is not merely a document—it reflects an operational reality.
The LoC remains the basis for military deployments, ceasefire arrangements, and ground-level mechanisms for ‘border’ management.
Regardless of political statements, both sides continue to function within its terms because no alternative framework exists to regulate such a sensitive and volatile boundary.
Suspending the Shimla Agreement may carry symbolic weight, especially for Pakistan in expressing its rejection of bilateralism and signaling a renewed push for international intervention.
However, it does not change the facts on the ground. India’s control over Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, and Pakistan’s hold over regions such as ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ and Gilgit-Baltistan are not governed by rhetoric, but by geography, troop deployments, and long-standing arrangements rooted in this accord.
Moreover, walking away from Shimla without proposing a new mechanism raises more questions than answers.
There is no clear successor framework that governs the LoC, defines ceasefire protocols, or supports direct dialogue.
Even during conflict—such as the 1999 Kargil War or subsequent standoffs—both sides have returned to the logic and structure of Shimla for communication, resolution, and restraint.
In effect, while the Shimla Agreement can be rejected in language, its practical architecture remains intact.
The management of the LoC, the avoidance of full-scale war, and the existence of bilateral channels—even when frozen—are all outcomes of that framework.
Without it, neither country has a ready formula to deal with day-to-day realities on the Kashmir frontier.
Declarations of suspension may appeal politically or diplomatically, but on the ground, the Shimla Agreement remains embedded in how both sides manage a divided Kashmir. Its relevance may be challenged, but its utility remains undeniable.